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基于预测执行的城轨装备芯片侧信道攻击检测系统

Side-channel attack detection system for urban rail transit equipment chips based on speculative execution

  • 摘要: 针对城市轨道交通站台门中控机所采用的Core i7处理器存在预测执行侧信道风险的问题,设计并实现了一套基于预测执行机制的侧信道攻击检测系统。文章阐述了系统架构,围绕PHT(Pattern History Table)、BTB(Branch Target Buffer)、RSB(Return Stack Buffer)等关键预测组件构建了测试样例生成、执行与结果分析等3个模块,能够自动生成多类型指令序列,并结合遗传算法与指令块管理策略实现对预测组件的高覆盖测试。实验结果表明,该系统能够自动构建并高效执行多类型分支测试样例,准确识别预测污染与异常推测执行路径,并揭示不同分支指令的结构性预测偏向及RET指令类似Spectre V2的潜在风险,可为装备芯片预测执行风险的精准评估与主动防护提供有力支撑。

     

    Abstract: To address the speculative execution side-channel risks in the Core i7 processor adopted by the central control unit of urban rail transit platform system, this paper designed and implemented a side-channel attack detection system based on the speculative execution mechanism. The paper described the system architecture and constructed three modules including test case generation, execution, and result analysis around key speculative components including the Pattern History Table (PHT), Branch Target Buffer (BTB), and Return Stack Buffer (RSB). The system automatically generates diverse instruction sequences and achieves high-coverage testing of speculative components by combining genetic algorithms and instruction block management strategies. Experimental results showed that the system automatically constructed and efficiently executed various branch test cases, accurately identified speculative pollution and abnormal speculative execution paths, and revealed the structural speculative bias of different branch instructions and the Spectre V2-like potential risks of RET instructions. This system provides strong support for accurate risk assessment and active protection against speculative execution

     

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